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Abstract: This paper investigates the impact of corporate boards’ gender diversity on voluntary
public disclosure of climate change risks in an emerging economy context in which environmental
regulations are weak and markets are ineffective. The investigation relies on data from the CDP
(formerly known as the Carbon Disclosure Project) as a corporate sustainability reporting initiative
supported by institutional investors, based on a sample of Turkish firms that were invited to disclose
their climate change risks and greenhouse gas emissions over the period of 2010–2019 through the
CDP platform. We report that the presence of women on board committees, as a proxy for their active
involvement in corporate governance, increases the likelihood of voluntary climate change disclosure.
We, on the other hand, found no evidence of a positive impact on climate change reporting with
women’s overall representation in boards. These findings lend support to board reforms that aim to
increase effective representation of women on boards for the better management of sustainability risks
and responsiveness to stakeholder demands in countries where legislators are reluctant to introduce
climate change reforms.
Keywords: climate change disclosure; boards of directors; corporate governance; gender diversity;
controlled firms; emerging economies
1. Introduction
Climate change is defined as one of the most important risks threatening life on Earth, and is a
major impediment to economic and social development [1,2]. Since climate change is highly correlated
with the greenhouse gas emissions from energy production that is vital for economic and social
development, it presents the “greatest challenge of our time”; staying within planetary boundaries
while pursuing long-term social and economic development [3]. This challenge is greater for developing
economies (See the special issue on Development Under Climate Change of Review of Development
Economics, 16(3), 2012, for a comprehensive analysis and the recent discussions at the United Nations’
Economic and Financial Committee on the unprecedented impacts of climate change disproportionately
burdening developing countries available at https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/gaef3516.doc.htm).
Despite the seriousness of the climate change threat, implementation of intergovernmental policy
agreements and legislative responses, reflected in UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
(https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld) in 2015 and the milestone
Paris Agreement (See conclusions agreed in December 2015 at http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/
9485.php), have so far come up short of setting a trajectory path that would limit global warming to 1.5 ◦C,
beyond which catastrophic events will become inevitable. As a response, a number of global initiatives
have focused on mobilizing market actors, namely companies and investors (See ICGN’s Viewpoint on
Systemic Risks at https://www.icgn.org/policy/viewpoints/investor-framework-addressing-systemic-
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risks). These efforts reflect a concern about the market failure in pricing unsustainability and regulatory
capture by interest groups [4].
On the regulatory front, the preferred approach has also shifted towards incentivising and
mobilising private actors and market mechanisms. In May 2018, the European Commission [5]
presented a package of measures as a follow-up to its action plan on financing sustainable growth.
The package focuses predominantly on capital markets in order to support the better allocation of
financial capital to companies and projects that are sustainable. A key instrument proposed in the
action plan is regulatory disclosure of environmental, social and governance risks by companies as well
as charging institutional investors with the fiduciary duty of taking this information into consideration
in investment decisions. The Commission specifically mentions “fostering sustainable corporate
governance”, with no further elaboration on what this actually means and how it is related to climate
change. While certain corporate disclosures related to climate change may be mandatory in some
countries to help the allocation of capital to more sustainable companies, discretionary reporting has
become an important matter of governance. Climate change poses physical (operational), financial
and reputational risks for companies. Detecting climate change-related risks, developing strategies to
manage them and disclosing those risks and risk management strategies are an essential part of boards’
fiduciary duties (See G20-OECD Corporate Governance Principles at https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/
governance/g20-oecd-principles-of-corporate-governance-2015_9789264236882-en).
In this context, companies are exposed to stakeholder pressures to disclose their carbon emissions
and climate change strategies, while institutional investors are also under pressure by asset owners,
especially by pension funds, to adopt better stewardship policies and take into account the materiality of
climate change risks when making investment decisions [6,7]. In response to these pressures, the number
of companies that voluntarily disclose climate change information beyond the regulatory requirements
has been increasing. Our research addresses the Commission’s shortcomings by investigating the
role of boards’ gender diversity as a board attribute that may have an impact on voluntary climate
change disclosure channelled through the better functioning of boards’ audit and risk management
committees. These committees are mandatory in most jurisdictions. Our inquiry is more relevant for
developing economies, where governments are concerned about the conflicts between growth and
climate change regulations and are therefore reluctant to introduce climate change reforms [8].
Companies are disclosing climate change information through general-purpose corporate social
responsibility (CSR) or sustainability reports, and increasingly through the CDP (Carbon Disclosure
Project)—a charity founded in London in 2000 with the backing of international institutional investors.
Each year, the CDP invites the largest listed companies around the world on behalf of signatory
investors to disclose their carbon emissions and detail how they manage the risks and opportunities
that stem from climate change. As of 2018, the number of companies that disclosed climate change
information in response to the CDP’s invitation was over 7000, representing 56% of the total global
market cap (See CDP’s website for data at https://www.cdp.net/en/data). Some rating agencies that
provide environmental, social and governance (ESG) ratings to institutional investors and index
builders use CDP data in their own assessments. The failure of regulatory approaches to mitigate
climate change makes it important to understand the drivers for companies to disclose climate change
information that may have implications on sustainable investing.
In the corporate governance literature, board composition—predominantly board
independence—is commonly used as a variable that can positively impact disclosure and transparency,
quality of risk management and long-term perspectives on value creation, on the basis that independent
directors are more concerned about their reputation. This argument is challenged by the fact that in
countries where companies are controlled, independent director markets are inefficient, and boards
are less effective. We refer the reader to Bebchuk and Hamdani [8] for a critical perspective on the
identification challenges for board independence in developing and emerging economies.
A growing stream of governance research focuses on the implications of boards’ gender diversity.
A review of this literature concludes that improving women’s access to boards is often but not always
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associated with financial performance [9], although evidence that the presence of women on boards
improves environmental, social and ethical aspects of firm behaviour is more equivocal [10]. Recent
papers focused on emerging economies suggests that the effect of gender diversity in boards is highly
contingent upon the power dynamics in the board and the cultural context [11–18]
Ensuring women’s full and effective participation at all levels of decision-making in political,
economic and public life is a key element of the 2030 Development Agenda, but the predicted
significance of such participation on climate change and sustainability is neither articulated nor
explored in policy debate. Recently, some empirical studies specifically investigated the effect of
boards’ gender diversity on sustainability and climate change reporting [11–14,19,20]. These studies
used different specifications to measure diversity and are unequivocal about the implications of boards’
gender diversity on sustainability and climate change disclosure. We argue that the mixed results
may be related to differences between the impact of different categories of female directors. Female
directors may be ineffective for a number of reasons. First, they may be sitting in the boards because
they are members of the controlling families, not because they are qualified. They may also represent
token appointments or be perceived as tokens by others which makes them ineffective. Women may
also be marginalized and therefore be less vocal, especially if the boards are dominated by controlling
shareholders who ultimately elect the directors.
In this study, we investigate whether the effective involvement of women in board governance
can partly compensate for weak climate change disclosure regulations and/or weak enforcement in
order to provide input on the discussions about board reforms in emerging economies. Specifically, we
examine the impact of gender diversity in board committees on climate change-related disclosures,
as directors on committees are better positioned to influence board governance. By focusing on the
relationship between climate change disclosure and the presence of women in audit and governance
committees in an emerging economy, we contribute to the scarce and unequivocal literature with an
in-depth look at women on boards.
Our results show that the inclusion of women in boards matters. However, as expected, it is not
the mere presence of women in boards, regardless of their typology, nor the diversity, but instead
women’s active involvement in the governance of the company, proxied by their participation in
governance and audit committees, that predicts climate change disclosure. We discuss these results in
the light of the governance regularities in Turkey, where boards are largely ineffective and controlled.
Our findings lend support to a more holistic approach to climate change disclosure and board reform
in emerging economies.
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature on the gender
diversity of corporate boards, Section 3 introduces the context, the sample and the estimation methods
employed for the analysis, Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes.
2. Background and Literature
2.1. Voluntary Disclosure
Voluntary disclosure is expected to reduce the cost of capital by reducing the asymmetry of
information between companies and investors according to the mainstream agency theory withstanding
the assumption of efficient markets [21,22]. Voluntary disclosure may also be a source of competitive
advantage by sending signals of better performance according to the signalling theory [23]. Climate
change disclosure may be a strategic choice and beneficial to better governed companies according to
these theories. Nevertheless, voluntary disclosure is considered to be a public good, since it can help
better allocate financial resources and, if sufficiently widespread, it can pave the way for uncontested
regulatory disclosure. Disclosure also improves internal controls and monitoring by the board. The
financial management and accounting literature is rich on the determinants and the outcomes of
voluntary disclosure of non-financial information. Voluntary disclosure is also addressed in the CSR
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and business ethics literature. The theory of legitimacy [24] and the stakeholder theory [25] are
commonly used to explain the voluntary reporting behaviour of companies [26].
Studies on climate change disclosure can be broadly divided into two categories; those focusing
on the determinants of disclosure and those focusing on the outcomes of disclosure, with most studies
falling into the latter category. The literature that focuses on the determinants spreads to a wide
spectrum of themes. For example, Calza at al. [27], in the case of Italy, showed a positive effect
of state ownership and a negative effect of ownership concentration on climate change reporting,
while studies that have focused on the outcome of disclosure have mostly looked at the effect on
financial performance and firm value [28,29]. The focus on firm value may be explained by the effect
of institutional investors defining climate change as the most important sustainability risk in terms of
financial materiality [30]. Another study [31] presents a review of this rich literature which largely
focuses on developed markets. Recently published exceptions include He et al. [32] on China, which
found that the greater the external pressure is, the higher the level of carbon information disclosure.
This relationship is stronger for state-owned and heavily polluting companies and for companies with
more effective boards. We make use of this literature to select our covariates.
2.2. Boards’ Gender Diversity and Disclosure
A stream of research seeks to understand how board gender composition affects organizational
outcomes, including disclosure. These studies commonly use agency theory [21], which argues that
women are better monitors because they are more independent, and resource dependence theory [33],
which theorizes that female directors are likely to add diversity to boards’ human capital which leads
to improved decision making [34,35]. The economic argument for diversity, on the other hand, focuses
on discrimination. If low levels of female directors are a result of gender discrimination, female director
appointments are likely to be drawn from the higher end of the ability/productivity distribution of
potential female directors [10]. Accordingly, a more gender diverse board may be associated with better
decision making, more efficient monitoring, as well as the replacement of less able male directors [34].
Another argument borrows from psychology research and emphasizes the differences in values
and traits based on the assumption that women on boards are similar to the general population of
women and therefore they are more ethical, risk-averse and long-term oriented [35]. A study by
Nielsen and Huse [36] suggested that women may be particularly sensitive to—and may exercise
influence on—decisions such as environmental politics.
Empirical studies have had mixed results. Overall, they have suggested that board composition
has no significant effect on firm performance and even that the effect of board gender diversity on firm
performance can be negative [37,38]. A meta-study by [39] confirmed a largely contextual relationship
between gender diversity and organizational outcomes in general, but a positive effect of female
directors on corporate social performance. The majority of these studies used US data.
Recently, some studies investigated the relationship between female directors and climate
change responsiveness and emission reporting. Research by Bravo [40] demonstrated a positive
relationship between the percentage of women in audit committees and environmental reporting in
Spain. Additionally, Glass et al. [20] examined the differences between companies with female and
male CEOs in Fortune 500 companies, which led to the conclusion that female leadership is more
effective in the implementation of environmentally friendly strategies. Studies using CDP data include
Ben-Amar et al. [41] on Canadian companies and Liao et al. [14] on UK companies. Both studies have
shown that a higher proportion of women on the board increases the probability of reporting to the
CDP. Studies on emerging economies are less consistent. Elmagrhi et al. [12] reported the association
between the percentage of women on the board and environmental disclosure and performance in
China. Contrary to other studies, Husted and de Sousa-Filho [42] report a negative effect of female
directors on environmental disclosure in Latin American countries.
Recent studies have revealed the importance of board committees on board effectiveness [43,44].
If decisions to appoint women are driven by social or political pressure leading to token representation,
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the implications of such appointments are likely to be ambiguous, as empirical evidence suggests.
Women, however, are less likely to be appointed to board committees if they are not expected to
contribute to the functioning of these committees. In the case of Turkey, Ararat and Yurtog˘lu [45]
reported that the presence of women in board committees predicts a higher quality of financial
reporting. We, therefore, investigate the implications of women’s presence both on boards and in
committees to differentiate the effect of independent and professionally qualified women in influencing
the climate change disclosure.
Our study contributes to the unequivocal research on the impact of board composition and gender
on climate change disclosure because of the unique and hand-collected data which allow us to identify
the contextual factors that affect this relationship in an emerging economy where most companies
are organised in business groups controlled by families. First of all, our data allows us to classify
directors not only according to their gender but also by their status and roles in the board, as well as
their affiliation with the controlling families. Second, it allows us to interpret our results under the
light of gender diversity trends in Turkey’s corporate landscape.
2.3. Our Context; Turkey
We chose Turkey for our investigation. Turkey is an ideal setting for our inquiry for a number of
reasons. First, there are no regulatory requirements for climate change disclosure or mitigation nor for
gender diversity in corporate boards. Climate change disclosure and the appointment of women on
boards are self-selected. The Capital Markets Board of Turkey is authorized by the Commercial Code to
regulate the governance of the listed companies in Turkey. The Corporate Governance Principles issued
by the Board specify both mandatory and recommended provisions relating to the board structure and
disclosure. Companies are required to set up an audit and a corporate governance committee and to
have a board of at least five directors. Independence became mandatory in 2012 and the percentage
of independent directors converged to 30%, based on the requirement for 1/3 of the directors to be
independent. The principles recommend that companies set a gender diversity target of no less than
25%, as well as disclose their progress towards the target on a “comply or explain” basis. However,
disclosure on compliance is not enforced [46].
Boards are largely statutory in Turkey. A majority of the firms are controlled by families and
floatation rates are low, with an average of around 30%. Important decisions are taken out of the
boardroom by the controlling shareholders. The role of board composition is ambiguous, with studies
reporting an insignificant and even negative effect of independent directors or female directors on
firms’ financial outcomes [47,48]. This is, however, not the entire story. A closer look at the data reveals
that while the percentage of women on boards has increased slowly from 11.2% to 15.9% from 2010
to 2019, this increase is predominantly a result of independent female director appointments [49].
More importantly, as independent female directors enter the board, they are likely to be appointed to
board committees. For example, in 2019 there were 144 independent women in 403 BIST companies.
In total, 122 of the women were appointed to audit committees and 91 were appointed to corporate
governance committees (with a significant overlap), representing 16% and 17% of the committee
members respectively. The rate of increase in the appointment of female independent directors to
committees is increasing. For example, the percentage of companies with a female audit committee
chair was 4.4%, while the percentage of women on committees was 11.5% in 2011. This ratio was 15.3%
and 15.9% in 2019. This shows that independent female director appointments are now less likely to be
token appointments and that women are more likely to be entrusted to lead the committee work.
The climate change disclosure front is more straight-forward but presents a bleak picture.
Turkey remains one of the two countries that have not ratified the Paris Agreement. More
importantly, it has the highest rate of greenhouse gas emission increase in the world, with a
coal dependent energy sector, and as such has been included amongst the five countries against
which climate activists have filed a legal complaint to the UN for violating the Rights of the Child
(See https://childrenvsclimatecrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/2019.09.23-CRC-communication-
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Sacchi-et-al-v.-Argentina-et-al.pdf). Independent scientists have rated Turkey’s climate actions as
critically insufficient, noting that if all states had the same level of target setting the global warming
would increase to 4 ◦C (See https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/turkey/, Commitments with
this rating fall well outside the fair share range and are not at all consistent with holding warming
to below 2 ◦C, let alone with the Paris Agreement’s stronger 1.5 ◦C limit. If all government targets
were in this range, warming would exceed 4 ◦C). This is also a result of Turkey’s departure from the
path of accession to the EU. The accession negotiations have been effectively frozen by the European
Commission in 2018 on the basis that Turkey has been backsliding in the areas of democracy, rule of
law and fundamental rights. Consequently, the pressure on harmonizing Turkey’s climate change
regulations with that of the EU has decreased. In these circumstances, the role of private actors and the
corporate boards become even more important.
In the absence of any regulations or incentives, voluntary disclosure of climate change information
reflects more effective board governance and responsiveness to stakeholder demands for companies that
do disclose. Surprisingly, a majority of Turkey’s largest companies disclose climate change information
to the CDP voluntarily and the market cap of companies that responds to the CDP’s invitation to
disclose approaches 50% of the total market cap [46]. Therefore, it is important to understand what
drives this unexpected level of disclosure. Turkey is also an important country on its own for this
investigation. It is the world’s 17th largest economy and one of the two OECD countries that are
considered to be still developing.
3. Data and Empirical Strategy
3.1. Sample Selection and Data
The CDP invited the largest listed firms in Turkey to disclose climate change information since
2010. Our study uses the data from the listed firms on BIST 100, the CDP’s official sample, from 2010 to
2019. The source of financial data was StockGround and the climate change data was retrieved from
the CDP (Carbon Disclosure Project) Turkey database maintained by the Corporate Governance Forum
of Turkey (CGFT) and the CDP. The board diversity data came from the CGFT, which collected the data
from KAP (Public Disclosure Platform), the companies’ annual reports and internet sources. STATA 15.1
was used to analyse the data. The data analysis included descriptive statistics, the correlation matrix
and multivariate logistic regression. Following related research such as [50] in order to control for the
endogeneity problem, the explanatory and control variables were lagged by one year.
3.2. Variables and Summary Statistics
Table 1 presents the description of the dependent, independent, and control variables, their
measures, and the source for data collection.
3.2.1. Dependent Variable (CDP Disclosure Status)
This study uses a binary variable (0/1) to evaluate the corporate response to the CDP’s request
regarding climate change. The CDP’s disclosure status equals one if the firm has responded to the
CDP’s request for public disclosure of climate change strategies and GHG emissions and zero otherwise.
Previous research [11,14,51–53] relied on a similar approach of capturing carbon disclosure strategies.
3.2.2. Independent Variables
This research used four proxies of female representation on the board of directors. We relied
on the Blau index of heterogeneity [54] as a proxy of board gender diversity. The Blau index can
take values from 0 when there is only one gender represented on the board to 0.5 when there are
equal numbers of female and male directors in the boardroom. Further, this index has been used
in prior research [26,55,56] which investigates the effect of board diversity on firm performance on
CDP disclosure.
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We also used three binary variables (one woman, two women, and three women) to test the effect of
a ‘critical mass’ of female directors on the propensity to provide climate change disclosures to the CDP.
We employed another group of binary variables (independent, professional and family) to see if women
board members influence CDP disclosure differently if they are independent, professional (all directors
who are not members of the families) or family members. Lastly, we examined whether the level of
women committee membership affects CDP disclosure. We tested women committee membership by
the number of female occupied seats in audit, corporate governance or both committees.
Table 1. Variable description.
VARIABLES Description Source
Dependent variable
CDPDISCLOSURE
CDP disclosure status (dummy variable that equals one if the firm
disclosed climate change information through CDP questionnaire and
zero otherwise)
CGFT/CDP
Board gender diversity
variables
BLAUINDEX
The Blau index of heterogeneity, H = 1−∑ni=1 Pi2 where n is number of
categories (2 for gender diversity) and Pi the proportion of group
members (fraction of female and male directors) in each category
CGFT/PDP
ONEWOMAN Dummy variable that equals 1 if there is at least one woman sitting onthe board of directors and zero otherwise CGFT/PDP
TWOWOMEN Dummy variable that equals 1 if there are at least two women sitting onthe board of directors and zero otherwise CGFT/PDP
THREEWOMEN Dummy variable that equals 1 if there are at least three women sittingon the board of directors and zero otherwise CGFT/PDP
NBWOMENIND Number of independent female directors on the board CGFT/PDP
NBWOMENPRO Number of professional female directors on the board CGFT/PDP
NBWOMENFAM Number of female directors who are controlling family members CGFT/PDP
NBWOMENAUC Number of female occupied seats in audit committee CGFT/PDP
NBWOMENCGC Number of female occupied seats in CG committee CGFT/PDP
NBWOMENCGCAUC Number of female occupied seats in either CG or audit committee CGFT/PDP
Corporate governance
variables
INDEPENDENCE Percentage of independent directors on the board PDP
CEONOTCOB Dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO is not the board chairpersonand zero otherwise CGFT
BOARDSIZE Total number of directors PDP
Other control variables
FIRMSIZE Logarithm of total assets StockGround
LEVERAGE Debt-to-equity ratio StockGround
FLOATATION Free floatation (fraction of freely trading shares) StockGround
PRICETOBOOK Price-to-book value of equity StockGround
PROFITABILITY Return on assets StockGround
GLOBALCOMPACT Global compact membership (Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firmis a member of UN Global Compact and zero otherwise
UN Global
Compact
HIGHCARBON
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm belongs to a high carbon
impact industrial sector. High carbon impact industries include
automobiles and components, chemicals, forest products, gas and
electrical utilities, oil and gas, mining, pipelines, precious metals, steel,
and transportation
CDP Reports
BUSINESSGROUP Dummy variable that equals one if company is a member of a businessgroup and zero otherwise CGFT
AGE Logarithm of (number of years since original listing on BIST + 1) StockGround
CGFT: Corporate Governance Forum of Turkey; PDP: Public Disclosure Platform; StockGround: Turkish
financial database.
3.2.3. Control Variables
We controlled for the effect of several variables that have been noted in the related literature
to affect the voluntary environmental disclosure of companies. We controlled for other board
attributes such as the percentage of independent directors. Previous studies [41,57,58] have shown
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that board independence affects voluntary disclosure. Some other research [41,59,60] has shown that
the separation of the chief executive officer (CEO) and board chairperson positions has a positive effect
on disclosure quality.
Large boards have a diverse range of experience and skills that may enable them to discharge
their duties more effectively [61]. This diversity means that different board members may represent
different interests, including those regarding environmental and GHG issues. Moreover, Booth and
Deli [62] argued that the uncertainty relating to environmental issues generally leads to large board
sizes, in order to allow firms’ access to the expertise necessary to overcome this uncertainty. In addition,
De Villers et al. [63] stated that larger boards have wider connections with important stakeholders, so
that as firms they are ‘likely to facilitate access to critical financial resources, allowing such boards
more financial leeway to pursue environmental initiatives’. Other disclosure studies that found a
positive association include those by Cormier et al. [64] for environmental disclosure in general,
Akhtaruddin et al. [65] for voluntary disclosure in Malaysia, and Allegrini and Greco [66] for voluntary
disclosure by Italian listed companies. Following the related studies, board size was measured by the
total number of board members.
We controlled for the financial variables affecting voluntary disclosure practices. Firm size may
have a significant impact on the extent of corporate voluntary disclosure. Large companies are
expected to have more resources to implement management systems to track their exposure to climate
change-related risks and their preparation of high-quality environmental information. Furthermore,
they are more likely to receive extensive attention from the media compared to smaller firms [51].
Previous studies have generally confirmed a positive association between firm size and the extent of
environmental reporting [67]. Firm size is expected to be positively associated with the likelihood of
response to CDP climate change disclosure. Following prior research, firm size was measured as the
natural logarithm of total assets.
Leverage was another control variable which was expected to increase the level of voluntary
disclosure due to bankruptcy risk; firms with higher debt ratios may choose to increase their voluntary
disclosure level to reduce leverage-related agency costs. Research by Brammer and Pavelin [68] argued
that higher leverage may reduce the financial resources available to managers to provide environmental
disclosures. They documented a negative association between leverage and environmental disclosures
in the UK. However, Luo, Tang and Lan [51] did not report a significant relationship between leverage
and the decision to respond to CDP questionnaires in the United States. The leverage was measured
by the debt to equity ratio.
Another control variable was the free float rate, which is used as an ownership indicator of Bursa
Istanbul firms. According to the agency theory, in a diffused ownership environment, firms will disclose
more information to reduce agency costs and information asymmetry [69]. Most of the findings of the
studies about voluntary disclosure behaviour give support to the agency theory-based hypothesis that
the extent of voluntary disclosure is positively correlated with the wider ownership structure.
Another control variable was the price to book ratio that measures growth opportunities. Firms
with good growth opportunities are expected to have higher financial needs and to provide extensive
discretionary disclosures to attenuate any potential information asymmetry with investors. Stanny
and Ely [51] did not report a significant relation between Tobin’s Q and the decision to respond to CDP
questionnaires by U.S. S&P 500 firms, however.
Profitability, measured by return on assets (ROA), was another control variable, showing mixed
evidence on voluntary disclosure. According to Brammer and Pavelin [68], financially healthy firms
should have more resources to devote to environmental disclosures. However, Stanny and Ely [51]
did not find any significant association between firm financial performance and environmental
disclosure either.
Previous studies [51,68] have suggested that a firm’s industry is a key determinant of its voluntary
disclosure strategy. Firms from carbon-intensive industries are subject to higher climate change-related
risks and therefore they are expected to provide more information about their climate change-related
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strategies compared to firms from low carbon industries. We followed the CDP (2008) methodology
and defined automobile and components, chemicals, forest products, gas and electrical utilities, oil
and gas, mining, pipelines, precious metals, steel, and transportation as high carbon impact industrial
sectors [41].
The business group in this study was a binary variable taking a value of one if a firm is member of
a business group and zero otherwise. Firms that are business group members are expected to disclose
their carbon emission information.
Lastly, firm age was another control variable in our study, measured by the logarithm of the
number of years a firm has been publicly listed on Bursa Istanbul. Related studies have shown that old
firms have more time to establish extensive stakeholder networks such as research centres to help with
climate change disclosure [70,71].
3.3. Research Model
In this study we investigated the effect of gender diversity and board attributes on climate change
disclosure using the following logistic regression model:
CDPDISCLOSURE(i,t)
= α0 + β1 Board gender diversity(i,t−1) + β2 INDEPENDENCE (i,t−1)
+β3 CEONOTCOB(i,t−1) + β4 BOARDSIZE(i,t−1) + β5 FIRMSIZE(i,t−1)
+ β6 LEVERAGE(i,t−1) + β7 FLOATATION(i,t−1) + β8 PRICETOBOOK(i,t−1)
+ β9 PROFITABILITY(i,t−1) + β10 GLOBALCOMPACT(i,t−1)
+ β11 HIGHCARBON(i,t−1) + β12 BUSINESSGROUP(i,t−1) + β13 AGE(i,t−1) + εi
(1)
CDPDISCLOSURE(i,t) is the climate change disclosure status of the company i in year t.
Board gender diversity(i,t−1) is the gender diversity dimension of company i in year t− 1. The gender
diversity dimensions are measured by the Blau gender diversity index, the binary variable for number
of women on board (at least one, two and three), the type of female directors (independent, professional
family member) and the number of women in audit and corporate governance committee. Furthermore,
we looked into the presence of women in board committees, namely on audit and corporate governance
committees that are mandatory. β is the coefficient term, εi is the error term and α0 is the constant.
Following similar studies such as [41,72], all independent and control variables were lagged by one year.
4. Results and Analysis
4.1. Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 provides the summary statistics of the study’s dependent, independent, and control
variables. The initial sample of this study consisted of firms that have been included in the BIST100
index from 2010 to 2019. Out of the 1000 firm year sample, missing data and the final numbers are
shown in Table 2. As shown in the table, an average of 28% of the sample firms provided information
to the CDP regarding climate change. Also, the sample firms are relatively large, as demonstrated
by the average size (log total assets) of 21.61. In addition, 58% of the sample firms belong to high
carbon industries.
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics.
VARIABLES N Mean Median SD Min Max
Dependent variable
CDPDISCLOSURE 978 0.28 0 0.45 0 1
Board gender diversity variables
BLAUINDEX 749 0.18 0.20 0.16 0 0.5
ONEWOMAN 749 0.60 1 0.49 0 1
TWOWOMEN 749 0.24 0 0.43 0 1
THREEWOMEN 749 0.08 0 0.27 0 1
NBWOMENIND 749 0.18 0 0.43 0 3
NBWOMENPRO 749 0.49 0 0.74 0 3
NBWOMENFAM 749 0.47 0 0.90 0 5
NBWOMENAUC 744 0.12 0 0.35 0 2
NBWOMENCGC 744 0.22 0 0.49 0 2
NBWOMENCGCAUC 744 0.34 0 0.70 0 4
Corporate governance variables
INDEPENDENCE 741 21.83 28.57 15.25 0 60
CEONOTCOB 744 0.47 0 0.50 0 1
BOARDSIZE 749 8.50 9 2.36 3 18
Other control variables
FIRMSIZE 770 21.61 21.61 1.50 17.68 26.64
LEVERAGE 767 1.58 1.09 1.87 −2.80 12.98
FLOATATION 869 36.09 32.00 18.86 2 100
PRICETOBOOK 866 2.04 1.39 2.50 −6.45 21.14
PROFITABILITY 770 0.03 0.03 0.08 −0.65 0.96
GLOBALCOMPACT 882 0.17 0 0.37 0 1
HIGHCARBON 1,000 0.58 1 0.49 0 1
BUSINESSGROUP 1,000 0.36 0 0.48 0 1
AGE 756 2.72 2.94 0.73 0 4.72
Table 3 displays the correlation analysis. Female committee membership in both audit and
corporate governance committees have a high correlation with voluntary disclosure. The other
dimensions of gender diversity do not show a significant correlation with CDP disclosure. There
are also positive and significant correlations between the percentage of independent directors on
boards and female committee membership and firm size. The relatively low correlation coefficients
among our explanatory variables suggest that multicollinearity may not be a serious threat in our
multivariate analysis.
4.2. Multivariate Analysis
Table 4 presents the results of logistic regression on board gender diversity and the control
variables. The proxies of gender diversity in these regressions were binary variables of presence of at
least one, two or three female board members and a measure of gender diversity (the BLAU index
value). None of the coefficients of a critical mass of one, two or three women nor the Blau Index
value show a significant effect on CDP disclosure. The only board attribute that is correlated with
CDP disclosure is board independence. We tested the interaction effect of board independence and
gender diversity on CDP disclosure. According to the un-tabulated results, the negative effect of the
BLAU index becomes positive when there are more independent board members. The change in
R-squared is (0.017), which is statistically significant. As expected, firm size, leverage, being a high
carbon industry firm, and firm age are significantly correlated to climate change disclosure. Being a
member of a business group is also correlated with climate change disclosure and all these variables
are correlated. This covariant is not tested in prior literature and can be explained by the reputational
concerns of large business groups. Profitability and floatation have no effect and market value has a
mildly significant effect.
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Table 3. Correlation matrix.
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1. CDPDISCLOSURE 1
2. BLAUINDEX 0.04 1
3. NBWOMENAUC 0.08 0.31 *** 1
4. NBWOMENCGC 0.16 *** 0.41 *** 0.41 *** 1
5. NBWOMENCGCAUC 0.15 *** 0.44 *** 0.77 *** 0.9 *** 1
6. INDEPENDENCE 0.20 *** 0.02 0.15 *** 0.2 *** 0.2 *** 1
7. CEONOTCOB 0.06 −0.05 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.06 1
8. BOARDSIZE 0.10 * −0.12 ** −0.02 −0.07 −0.05 0.37 *** 0.4 *** 1
9. FIRMSIZE 0.27 *** 0.05 0.02 0.14 *** 0.11 ** 0.39 *** 0.2 *** 0.4 *** 1
10. LEVERAGE 0.20 *** 0.00 −0.03 0.04 0.01 0.2 *** 0.2 *** 0.2 *** 0.3 *** 1
11. FLOATATION −0.10 * 0.01 0.00 −0.03 −0.02 −0.04 −0.1 *** −0.1 * −0.2 *** −0.1 * 1
12. PRICETOBOOK −0.03 −0.18 *** −0.04 −0.08 −0.07 −0.02 0.03 0.06 −0.1 ** 0.4 *** −0.08 * 1
13. PROFITABILITY 0.00 0.08 * −0.02 0.00 −0.01 −0.05 −0.04 0.01 0.00 −0.2 *** −0.07 0.2 *** 1
14. GLOBALCOMPACT 0.09 * 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.17 *** −0.02 0.1 ** 0.2 *** 0.01 −0.18 *** −0.1 ** −0.01 1
15. HIGHCARBON 0.14 *** 0.03 −0.06 −0.02 −0.05 −0.03 0.08 −0.01 −0.09 * 0.1 *** −0.11 ** 0.2 *** 0.2 *** −0.05 1
16. BUSINESSGROUP 0.14 *** 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.03 −0.04 −0.02 −0.09 * 0.02 −0.03 −0.19 *** 0.07 0.08 * 0.06 0.2 *** 1
17. AGE 0.15 *** 0.11 ** −0.02 0.07 0.04 0.1 * 0.1 * 0.2 *** 0.06 −0.1 ** −0.02 −0.2 *** 0.03 0.1 * 0.1 *** −0.02 1
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 4. Logistic regression results: effect of BLAU index and critical mass of female directors on carbon disclosure.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
CDPDISCLOSURE CDPDISCLOSURE CDPDISCLOSURE CDPDISCLOSURE
Coefficient Z Stat Coefficient Z Stat Coefficient Z Stat Coefficient Z Stat
BLAUINDEX −0.23 (−0.38)
ONEWOMAN −0.184 (−0.89)
TWOWOMEN 0.014 −0.03
THREEWOMEN −0.232 (−0.62)
INDEPENDENCE 0.02 *** (3.15) 0.023 *** −3.19 0.023 *** −2.65 0.219 *** −2.64
CEONOTCOB −0.12 (−0.54) −0.13 (−0.60) −0.116 (−0.61) −0.127 (−0.58)
BOARDSIZE −0.01 (−0.27) −0.01 (−0.21) −0.01 (−1.02) −0.414 (−0.98)
FIRMSIZE 0.31 *** (3.80) 0.307 *** −3.77 0.309 *** −3.76 0.310 *** −3.82
LEVERAGE 0.23 *** (3.41) 0.231 *** −3.48 0.223 *** −3.4 0.228 *** −3.44
FLOATATION −0.00 (−0.23) −0.002 (−0.26) −0.001 (−0.40) −0.00218 (−0.35)
PRICETOBOOK −0.10 * (−1.76) −0.102 * (−1.87) −0.091 * (−1.74) −0.0958 * (−1.79)
PROFITABILITY 0.53 (0.38) 0.611 −0.44 0.482 −0.34 0.52 −0.37
GLOBALCOMPACT 0.02 (0.08) 0.031 −0.12 0.02 −0.04 0.00114 0
HIGHCARBON 0.69 *** (2.89) 0.711 *** −2.96 0.697 *** −2.85 0.648 *** −2.64
BUSINESSGROUP 0.68 *** (3.28) 0.680 *** −3.29 0.674 *** −3.25 0.669 *** −3.25
AGE 0.47 *** (2.98) 0.479 *** −3.03 0.463 *** −2.91 0.464 *** −2.96
Constant −10.19 *** (−5.71) −10.141 *** (−5.67) −10.225 *** (−4.94) −9.276 *** (−4.98)
Observations 621 621 621 621
Pseudo R-sq 0.141 0.142 0.141 0.137
log-like −326.4 −326 −326.4 −327.9
Prob > chi2 0 0 0 0
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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We then looked at the different categories of female directors to understand if women affiliated
with dominant families who did not suffer from the glass ceiling effect and women who are professional
outsiders have a different effect on disclosure. Table 5 presents the results of logistic regression on the
presence of different categories of female directors and the control variables. The proxies of gender
diversity in these regressions are binary variables of the presence of independent, professional or
controlling family affiliated women on boards. The results do not show any significant effect of these
independent variables on CDP disclosure. The presence of independent women has no significant
effect when controlled for total independence. It is, however, worth noting that the coefficient for
family affiliated women is negative, whereas the coefficient for the presence of professional women is
positive. These results should also be interpreted in consideration of the patriarchal culture. Some of
the family affiliated female directors sit in the board together with family affiliated male directors. It is
likely that female board members affiliated with families are less vocal when their fathers or brothers
sit in the board. Both male and female members of the families sit in the boards of roughly 38% of the
companies whose boards include family affiliated directors.
Table 5. Logistic regression results: effect of female independent, professional and family board
members on CDP disclosure.
Model 1
CDPDISCLOSURE
Model 2
CDPDISCLOSURE
Model 3
CDPDISCLOSURE
Coefficient Z Stat Coefficient Z Stat Coefficient Z Stat
NBWOMENIND −0.03 (−0.12)
NBWOMENPRO 0.05 (0.38)
NBWOMENFAM −0.105 (−0.93)
INDEPENDENCE 0.02 *** (3.13) 0.02 *** (2.62) 0.216 *** (2.60)
CEONOTCOB −0.11 (−0.52) −0.11 (−0.60) −0.123 (−0.56)
BOARDSIZE −0.01 (−0.21) −0.01 (−1.02) −0.421 (−0.99)
FIRMSIZE 0.31 *** (3.80) 0.31 *** (3.73) 0.305 *** (3.79)
LEVERAGE 0.22 *** (3.39) 0.22 *** (3.42) 0.235 *** (3.51)
FLOATATION −0.00 (−0.23) −0.00 (−0.39) −0.00216 (−0.35)
PRICETOBOOK −0.09 * (−1.73) −0.09 * (−1.72) −0.0999 * (−1.86)
PROFITABILITY 0.49 (0.35) 0.46 (0.32) 0.553 (0.40)
GLOBALCOMPACT 0.02 (0.09) 0.02 (0.03) 0.00423 (0.02)
HIGHCARBON 0.69 *** (2.89) 0.69 *** (2.84) 0.642 *** (2.65)
BUSINESSGROUP 0.67 *** (3.26) 0.67 *** (3.21) 0.658 *** (3.19)
AGE 0.46 *** (2.93) 0.46 *** (2.89) 0.470 *** (2.98)
Constant −10.24 *** (−5.73) −10.18 *** (−4.91) −9.137 *** (−4.96)
Observations 621 621 621
Pseudo R-sq 0.141 0.141 0.138
log-like −326.4 −326.4 −327.7
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Having no evidence of an impact of women’s presence in boards on climate change disclosure,
we turn to the impact of women’s presence in the board committees, which we expect to be a better
predictor of more effective governance based on the prior board literature cited above. Table 6 presents
the results of logistic regression on board committee diversity and control variables. The proxies of
gender diversity in committees in these regressions are the number of women in audit committees,
corporate governance committees and in both committees. Based on the results, the effects are
significant at 10% for the number of women in audit committee and corporate governance, respectively.
The effect is more significant at 5% when there are more women in both audit and corporate governance
committees. Committees are small teams, with a median of 2 members. In such small teams, the
presence of one woman represents a considerably higher gender diversity than the presence of women
at 10–15% in the boards during the study period. Are these women more qualified? We are not able
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to compare the qualifications of women on committees with the qualifications of other women or
men in general, but it is likely that they are professionally qualified since committee membership
requires a higher level of skills, especially for the audit committee. Committees are unlikely to include
the chairman of the firm, who in many cases dominates the board deliberations as a member of the
dominant families. This may create an environment where women can become more vocal.
Table 6. Logistic regression results: effect of female committee membership on CDP disclosure.
Model 1
CDPDISCLOSURE
Model 2
CDPDISCLOSURE
Model 3
CDPDISCLOSURE
Coefficient Z Stat Coefficient Z Stat Coefficient Z Stat
NBWOMENAUC 0.48 * (1.73)
NBWOMENCGC 0.36 * (2.10)
NBWOMENCGCAUC 0.327 ** (2.40)
INDEPENDENCE 0.02 *** (2.81) 0.02 *** (2.20) 0.178 ** (2.09)
CEONOTCOB −0.16 (−0.72) −0.12 (−0.65) −0.169 (−0.76)
BOARDSIZE −0.01 (−0.18) −0.00 (−0.63) −0.265 (−0.62)
FIRMSIZE 0.32 *** (3.87) 0.30 *** (3.60) 0.300 *** (3.69)
LEVERAGE 0.23 *** (3.46) 0.22 *** (3.32) 0.223 *** (3.38)
FLOATATION −0.00 (−0.27) −0.00 (−0.38) −0.00247 (−0.40)
PRICETOBOOK −0.09 * (−1.70) −0.08 (−1.61) −0.0850 (−1.63)
PROFITABILITY 0.49 (0.35) 0.39 (0.26) 0.394 (0.29)
GLOBALCOMPACT 0.00 (0.02) 0.04 (0.15) 0.0255 (0.10)
HIGHCARBON 0.73 *** (3.02) 0.72 *** (2.93) 0.731 *** (3.01)
BUSINESSGROUP 0.67 *** (3.21) 0.64 *** (3.08) 0.637 *** (3.07)
AGE 0.48 *** (3.02) 0.45 *** (2.79) 0.450 *** (2.86)
Constant −10.45 *** (−5.82) −10.06 *** (−4.96) −9.419 *** (−5.05)
Observations 621 621 621
Pseudo R-sq 0.145 0.145 0.144
log-like −325 −324.7 −325.2
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Based on the observation of the impact of women in audit committees on climate change disclosure,
we wanted to know whether the gender of audit committee membership matters. We then regressed
the female audit committee chairmanship on climate change disclosure. The un-tabulated results
show that the impact of a female audit committee chair is larger than the impact of women’s presence
in audit committees. The effect of a female audit committee chair is significant at a 5% level, with
coefficient of 1.025 and a z stat of 2.2, which shows a high influence on climate change disclosure. As
shown in Table 6, the coefficients of the number of women in audit committees, corporate governance
committees and either of those committees are 0.48, 0.36 and 0.33, respectively. The odds ratios of the
mentioned variables are 1.62, 1.43 and 1.39, respectively (odds ratio equals to exp(coefficient) in logistic
regression). This means that adding one woman to an audit committee could increase the likelihood of
climate change information disclosure by 62%. This number for corporate governance committees is
43%. Moreover, the odds ratio for a female audit committee chair is 2.79, which shows that the chances
of disclosure are almost 3 times as high when a woman is appointed as an audit committee chair.
Furthermore, in order to test the robustness of the model, we analysed the effect of board independence
on climate change disclosure, while using female committee membership and the Blau index of gender
diversity as control variables. Similarly to Table 6, the rest of the control variables were still included
in this regression equation. The findings were consistent with the results that are presented in Table 6,
showing the significant effect of board independence and female committee membership at 5% level.
These results provide reasonable evidence that board diversity reforms that mandate or encourage
gender diversity in boards can improve the levels of climate change disclosure; however, not all women
are equally effective, as the results indicate. We see no effect of the overall presence of women in
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boards on climate change disclosure in Turkey when they are all clustered together. On the other
hand, although statistically insignificant, the negative coefficient of female board members who are
affiliated with controlling families, constituting approximately half of all female directors, is the
largest. The coefficient turns positive when only non-family board members (professional female
board members) are included in the regressions. This may indicate that female family members have a
lower competence, or they are less interested in transparency and risk management than professional
female board members. Further research is needed to test these possible explanations.
A more plausible explanation of the no-effect could be “marginalization”. Over the study period,
the average percentage of women on boards was less than one within an average board size of 8.5 for
the sample firms. Most companies with female board members had one or two female directors. On
the other hand, women in committees would not be marginalized, since the average committee size is
three (un-tabulated). Furthermore, directors who are appointed to audit committees, and the majority
of the heads of risk management and corporate governance committees must be independent. It is safe
to assume that the women in board committees are independent and competent. Since the functioning
of committees is important for the board to fulfil their fiduciary duties, the boards are more likely to
choose competent members to the committees than token members.
5. Conclusions and Implications for Reforms
This paper investigates the potential impact of board composition on corporate disclosure of
climate change-related information. Our inquiry relies on the global CDP initiative, backed up by
institutional investors around the world, and the CDP database of corporate climate change disclosures.
The study makes use of hand collected data of a sample of the largest Turkish companies over
the period 2010–2019. The institutional context of our investigation makes our results relevant for
countries with weak environmental regulations, a high gender gap, high ownership concentration and
ineffective boards dominated by controlling shareholders. The results suggest that the main driver
of climate change disclosure in Turkey for the period between 2010 and 2019 is internal governance
exercised by the boards, not the regulations. Overall, the results show that board independence is a
significant predictor of climate change disclosure, but the effect of female independent directors is
insignificant and inconsistent, thus, the presence of women on boards doesn’t have any predictive
power on climate change disclosure. We report, however, reasonable evidence for the positive impact
of independent female directors on voluntary climate change disclosure. Given the fact that almost
half of the women on corporate boards in Turkey are affiliated with the owner families in Turkey, these
results confirm that not all female directors are the same. The presence of female directors predicts
voluntary disclosure of climate change information when they are professionally qualified and when
they are given the opportunity to influence the governance of the firm. This opportunity takes the
form of board committee membership in the case of Turkey.
Our results are of interest to regulators and policy makers. Gender diversity in boards has become a
criterion for investment analysis and inclusion in indices (See, for example, FTSE All-Share®Women on
Boards Leadership Index and Russell 1000®Women on Boards Leadership Index calculated by London
Stock Exchange Group. Methodologies developed by rating agencies to use in scoring companies’ ESG
performance include board gender diversity as a criterion. See Vigeo-EIRIS (http://vigeo-eiris.com/)
and Sustainalytics (https://www.sustainalytics.com/) as examples.) that aim to capture sustainability
indicators [37]. Although the argument for the inclusion of women is supported by moral concerns
about discrimination, stemming from the incongruence of the percentage of women in the labour
force and percentage of women in decision making bodies including boards, studies, including this
study, show that a closer look at board dynamics is necessary in formulating board reforms if the
purpose goes beyond moral imperatives, which takes into consideration the ownership structures
and the cultural norms. Our results support the argument for board reforms that encourage board
independence, board gender diversity and nomination processes that can mitigate gender biases.
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